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I. BACKGROUND: HOW PRIVACY LAW AFFECTS MEDICAL AND 
SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
Over the last half-dozen or so years, people and companies 
involved in medical and other scientific research have become 
increasingly concerned about privacy law, both domestic and 
international. I base this observation on several things, including the 
requests for consultation that I receive from lawyers and non-
lawyers in the academic and private sectors, the contents of 
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conferences where I am asked to speak, and my reading of the 
academic and trade literatures. This concern is entirely rational, as 
those who do research, whether academic or commercial, are the 
very kinds of people who need to worry about privacy—of their 
customers, users, patients, and subjects. 
In this essay, I will briefly review three major developments that 
are having, or likely will have, significant implications for the 
research community. The first (Part II.A) is international: the 
European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
which takes effect on May 25, 2018. The other two are domestic: 
the forthcoming revisions to the Common Rule, a regulation that 
governs all federally funded research in the United Sates (Part II.B); 
and the Federal Trade Commission’s recent foray into the regulation 
of health data (Part II.C). In Part III, I will offer some concluding 
thoughts. First, however, I will provide a brief outline of the sources 
of privacy law and how it affects medical and other scientific 
research. 
A. Sources of Modern Privacy Law 
In the U.S., there is as yet no general federal privacy law. Federal 
privacy laws and regulations laws are sector-specific,1 covering such 
areas as health (through the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996, or HIPAA)2, finance (through the 
Gramm-Leach Bliley Act),3 and online businesses that target 
children (Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, or COPPA).4 In 
addition, the Federal Trade Commission is beginning to assert itself 
as a general regulator of privacy. There are also some federal 
criminal laws that have privacy implications (anti-hacking5 and anti-
                                                 
 1 See Ieuan Jolly, Data Protection in the United States: Overview, THOMAS 




 2 HIPAA Privacy Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 160. 
 3 Privacy of Consumer Financial Information Rule of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 
16 C.F.R. § 313. 
 4 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–05. 
 5 E.g., Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030. 
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wiretapping laws,6 for instance), but these are beyond the scope of 
this discussion. 
In the absence of a comprehensive federal privacy law, the states 
are the most important source of general privacy law. California has 
long been the leader, and remains so. Hence one piece of advice I 
often give to clients: comply with California law and you will 
usually be compliant in the other 49 states. 
The development of international privacy law has been driven 
by the European Union, with other countries (except the U.S.) 
following its lead and adopting EU-style laws. The EU approach is 
fundamentally different from that taken in this country. The 
development of U.S. privacy statutes, both state and federal, has 
largely been motivated by a concern with the financial consequences 
of identity theft. Thus, most American laws protect “personally 
identifiable information,” usually defined as a name, social security 
number, or the like that is linked to an account number or other 
financial identifier. In Europe, by contrast, privacy is treated as a 
fundamental human right—what Americans would think of as a 
constitutional right.7 This is understandable, since there are millions 
of people in Europe with a living memory of storm troopers or secret 
police knocking on doors in the middle of the night and dragging 
people away. Consequently, EU privacy law is generally far more 
protective than American privacy law, protecting any kind of 
personal information, prohibiting any kind of intrusion on privacy 
or seclusion, and putting a much greater burden of compliance on 
businesses and other private actors (but not always on 
governments—think of the ubiquitous surveillance cameras that 
saturate the United Kingdom). 
B. Four Waves of U.S. State Privacy Laws 
State privacy laws have come in what privacy lawyers 
sometimes refer to as four waves. The first, toward the end of the 
last century, consisted of antihacking laws, both criminal and civil.8 
                                                 
 6 E.g., Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22. 
 7 See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8, 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf. 
 8 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 502 (West 2016). 
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The second, or “reactive” wave, led by a 2003 California law, 
required notification to potential victims of data security breaches.9 
The third, “proactive” wave (and my apologies to literate people 
everywhere for having to use that dreadful word), again stimulated 
by California legislation, requires that entities holding personally 
identifiable information use “reasonable security procedures and 
practices.”10 The fourth wave of state laws (also characterized as 
proactive),11 which are in the process of being enacted, require such 
specific security measures as encryption and physical and technical 
controls.12 A parallel development is that California and other states 
are moving into the health sector with privacy requirements that may 
be more onerous than those imposed by HIPAA.13 
It is important to emphasize two other things about these state 
laws. First, unless specifically preempted, or displaced, by a federal 
law like HIPAA, the prudent assumption is that they will apply to 
medical and other scientific research in addition to any relevant 
federal law.14 Second, many of them apply to all kinds of data media, 
from paper records to the cloud.15 In fact, there is little privacy law 
anywhere that relates specifically to the cloud, so cloud-using 
researchers must try to adapt the existing rules to that environment. 
C. Research-Related U.S. Federal Privacy Laws 
1. HIPAA 
The HIPAA Privacy Rule limits unauthorized use of personally 
identifiable health information to care-related activities by providers 
                                                 
 9 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (West 2017). See generally Jolly, supra note 1. 
 10 E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(c) (West 2016). 
 11 See Julie Tower-Pierce, Proactive State Privacy Laws Change Security 
Focus to Prevention, TechTarget (Feb. 2009), 
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/magazineContent/Proactive-state-privacy-
laws-change-security-focus-to-prevention. 
 12 E.g., 201 MASS. CODE REGS. § 17 (2009). 
 13 E.g., California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, CAL. CIV. CODE 
§§ 56-56.37 (West 2000). 
 14 HIPAA does not preempt state privacy laws that provide greater protection 
than it does. See Does the HIPAA Privacy Rule Preempt State Laws?, HHS.GOV 
(last visited July 26, 2013), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/faq/399/does-hipaa-preempt-state-laws/index.html. 
 15 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-65(a) (2009). 
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and their “business associates.”16 However, unauthorized research 
use or disclosure is permitted, as long as the activity is approved by 
an Institutional Review Board. The use of de-identified health data 
is generally not restricted. Overall, HIPAA requires “reasonable and 
appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards” in 
the handling of health data. Here, as elsewhere, federal law is 
technology-neutral, covering data media from paper to the cloud. 
2. FTC Act 
Under the New Deal-era Federal Trade Commission Act, the 
FTC has broad jurisdiction to prohibit and prevent “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices.”17 The FTC has jurisdiction over all for-
profit companies involved in interstate commerce, but not non-
profits—a significant distinction for many research entities.18 Until 
the last few years, the FTC’s approach to privacy was simple: if you 
have an announced privacy policy, make sure you live up to it. More 
recently, however the FTC has begun to create and enforce 
substantive standards for privacy policies and practices, setting itself 
up as an all-purpose federal privacy regulator.19 The new initiative 
focuses on “privacy by design,” including reasonable efforts in data 
security, collection limits, data retention and disposal, and data 
                                                 
 16 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502(e), 164.504(e), 164.532(d)-(e) (2013). See Business 
Associates, HHS.GOV (last visited May 13, 2018), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/privacy/guidance/business-associates/index.html. 
 17 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2018). See A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FTC (last updated 
July 2008), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority. 
 18 15 U.S.C. §§ 44, 45(a) (2018). See Opportunities and Challenges in 
Advancing Health Information Technology: Hearing Before the House Oversight 
and Government Reform Subcommittees on Information Technology and Health, 




 19 For a review of this history, see FTC STAFF, PROTECTING CONSUMER 
PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR 
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accuracy.20 The FTC’s authority to enforce these standards has been 
upheld by a federal appellate court in the Wyndham Hotels case.21 
The FTC has promised a collaborative, “soft-law” (best 
practices rather than rules) approach, but there are skeptics 
(including me).22 The FTC issued a Privacy Framework report in 
March 2012 that fills in many details of its evolving standards and 
regulatory plans.23 Even though non-profit research organizations 
are not subject to the FTC’s jurisdiction, it would be prudent to 
assume that other regulators will look to the Privacy Framework for 
guidance in developing their own standards. Accordingly, it would 
make sense to treat the FTC framework as, at a minimum, a set of 
best practices to consult in shaping an organization’s privacy 
program. 
D. International Law: The EU Approach 
Until May 25, 2018, the EU will continue to operate under its 
1995 Data Protection Directive.24 A Directive is a detailed standard 
that individual member countries must adopt through national 
legislation, a process that inevitably produces country-by-country 
variation.25 Thus, compliance currently requires familiarity with 
both the directive and the national laws of the particular countries in 
which research data will be collected, processed, or stored. The new 
GDPR,26 by contrast, will take effect automatically in all member 
countries.27 It will perpetuate the Directive’s core principles and 
requirements and will add a good deal more. Its specific 
implications for research are discussed below. 
                                                 
 20 See FTC Issues Final Commission Report on Protecting Consumer Privacy: 
Agency Calls on Companies to Adopt Best Privacy Practices, FTC (Mar. 26, 
2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/03/ftc-issues-final-
commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy. 
 21 FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 22 FTC STAFF, supra note 19 at i. 
 23 Id. at 15. 
 24 Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31. 
 25 See Regulations, Directives and Other Acts, EUR. UNION, 
https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
 26 Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) (EU). 
 27 See Regulations, Directives and Other Acts, EUR. UNION, 
https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
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The core features of the 1995 Directive include the following: 
• It covers all “personal data”: anything identifiable to a 
person.28 
• Health-related and genetic data are always “sensitive,” and 
thus subject to enhanced protection.29 
• The burden of compliance is on the “controller”—the party 
that directs “processing,” which includes collection, storage, 
transmission, or analysis of the data.30 
• Consent of the data subject is generally required for any 
processing.31 
• Processing must be for legitimate purposes and proportional 
to those processes.32 
• The subject has rights of access, objection and opt-out.33 
• The controller must ensure the security and integrity of the 
data.34 
For American companies dealing in any kind of EU personal 
data, one of the most daunting aspects of the 1995 Directive is a set 
of rules concerning transferring personal data to non-EU countries.35 
These rules govern both intra-and inter-company transfers, and 
clearly apply to medical and scientific research data. Absent specific 
individual consent, transfer is generally forbidden unless the EU has 
certified the recipient country as providing EU-level privacy 
protection. The U.S. does not meet this standard, a problem that will 
persist under the GDPR. The following alternatives are available:36 
1. The subject can give unambiguous consent to the transfer. 
                                                 
 28 Regulation 2016/679, supra note 26 at 33. 
 29 Id. at 34. GDPR Recitals and Articles, recitals 34, 35, art 4. 
 30 Id. at recital 18, arts. 2(b), (d)-(e). 
 31 Id. at recital 31, art. 7(a). 
 32 Id. at arts. 6(c), 7. 
 33 Id. at arts. 10-14. 
 34 Id. at arts. 6, 16-17. 
 35 Id. at recitals 56-60, arts. 25-26. 
 36 See International Transfers, EUROPEAN DATA PROT. SUPERVISOR, 
https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/data-protection/reference-
library/international-transfers_en (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
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2. The U.S. data importer can enter the EU-U.S. Department of 
Commerce Privacy Shield program, whereby a U.S company 
certifies that its policies and practices meet EU standards.37 A 
predecessor program (the Safe Harbor) was invalidated by the Court 
of Justice for the European Union for providing inadequate 
protection against U.S. government snooping.38 Because of this 
inadequacy, the CJEU held, the Safe Harbor violated the European 
Charter of Human Rights. The Privacy Shield is facing similar 
criticism, and the outcome is uncertain.39 This Privacy Shield is not 
available to nonprofits because they are not subject to the FTC’s 
jurisdiction. 
3. The exporter and importer can use EU-approved contract 
terms (“model contractual clauses”) between the data exporter and 
importer.40 The parties must adopt the clauses without any 
modification whatsoever. The U.S. party must promise to provide 
EU-level protection, “respond” to EU mediation and “accept” the 
decision of a European national court. Because of these and other 
provisions, as well as their non-negotiability, the model contractual 
clauses are rarely acceptable to U.S. companies. 
4. The U.S. data importer can do the same thing through 
“binding corporate rules.”41 The American company must amend its 
bylaws to adopt the EU principles and provide mechanisms for 
                                                 
 37 See Privacy Shield Overview, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/Program-Overview (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
 38 See Court of Justice of the European Union Press Release No 117/15, The 
Court of Justice Declares That the Commission’s US Safe Harbour Decision Is 
Invalid (Oct. 6, 2015), https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs
/application/pdf/2015-10/cp150117en.pdf. 
 39 See Julia Fioretti, EU Regulators Threaten Court Challenge to EU-U.S. Data 
Transfer Pact (Dec. 6, 2017, 6:37 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-
dataprotection-usa/eu-regulators-threaten-court-challenge-to-eu-u-s-data-
transfer-pact-idUSKBN1E01DP. 
 40 See Model Contracts for the Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries, 
EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-
transfers-outside-eu/model-contracts-transfer-personal-data-third-countries_en 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
 41 See Binding Corporate Rules, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law
/law-topic/data-protection/data-transfers-outside-eu/binding-corporate-rules_en 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
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ensuring compliance. This approach has been equally unpopular in 
this country. 
A further concern of those doing research under the current 
Directive is the sheer complexity of the law. All medical data, and 
much other scientific research data, is characterized as “sensitive” 
and thus subject to the highest level of scrutiny and restriction. Since 
the Directive has been implemented at the national level, there is 
significant country-by-country variation in the laws and regulations 
pertaining to research.42 Those national laws and regulations are, like 
the Directive itself, detailed and complex. Nonetheless, it has been 
possible for a non-EU research entity to simplify compliance for a 
multinational research project by creating an “establishment” (or 
place of business) in one country and centralizing the project there.43 
Many American researchers believe that the UK has offered the 
most research-friendly environment in which to set up an 
establishment (in addition to avoiding language barriers). With 
Brexit looming, of course, any predictions about this or any aspect 
of the EU-UK legal relationship are speculative. 
Under current law, critical country-by-country regulatory 
variables include: whether the approval of the national Data 
Protection Authority (DPA) is required before collecting data; 
whether individual subject consent is necessary and, if so, what form 
of consent is sufficient in order to collect or export particular kinds 
of data; and whether de-identified or anonymized data is exempt 
from regulation.44 
                                                 
 42 E.g., Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 24, at art. 2; see Gauthier Chassang, The 
Impact of the EU General Data Protection Regulation on Scientific Research, 11 
ECANCERMEDICALSCIENCE 709 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov
/pmc/articles/PMC5243137/. 
 43 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 24, at recital 19, art. 4. 
 44 See Andrew Charlesworth, Data Protection and Research Data: Questions 
and Answers, JISC (2016), https://www.ukdataservice.ac.uk/media/604452
/jisclegal-data-protection-and-research-data.pdf. 
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II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC 
A. The EU GDPR 
On April 14, 2016, the Parliament of the European Union gave 
final approval to the long-discussed GDPR, which will replace the 
current regime of country-by-country laws under the 1995 Data 
Protection Directive.45 Whereas an EU Directive requires 
implementation by individual EU member states, the GDPR is a 
Regulation (much like a federal law in this country) that will take 
immediate effect in all EU countries on May 25, 2018.46 This 
forthcoming unification of EU law will have both costs and benefits 
for researchers. 
1. Key Features of the GDPR 
As noted earlier, the GDPR builds on and expands the privacy 
protections provided by the current Directive. The key features of 
the GDPR include the following: 
• The GDPR continues the broad definition of “personal data” 
to include any information from which a natural person can be 
identified.47 
• In principle, the GDPR applies to all “controllers” and 
“processors” of EU residents’ personal data, regardless of their 
location. A processor is anyone who collects, manipulates, uses, or 
stores personal data; a controller is a party that directs or controls 
processing. 48 Parties outside the EU are subject to jurisdiction if 
they offer goods or services to EU residents or monitor their 
behavior.49 
• Personal data can be collected only for “specified, explicit 
and legitimate purposes” and can be processed only in ways that are 
compatible with those purposes.50 
                                                 
 45 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 24. 
 46 Regulations, Directives and Other Acts, EUR. UNION, 
https://europa.eu/european-union/eu-law/legal-acts_en (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
 47 Regulation 2016/679, supra nota 26 at art. 4(1). 
 48 Id. at art. 4(2), (7)-(8). 
 49 Id. at arts. 2-3. 
 50 Id. at recital 170, art. 5. 
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• In most cases, a controller must get specific, informed, and 
unambiguous affirmative consent to collect and process data; merely 
providing an opt-out right is insufficient. 51 “Explicit” consent is 
required for sensitive data, such as genetic or biometric data or data 
pertaining to health, sexuality, or political views. Subjects must be 
able to withdraw consent at any time and it must be as easy to 
withdraw consent as to give it.52 Controllers bear the burden of being 
able to demonstrate consent upon demand by a DPA.53 
• DPAs can fine violators up to 4% of gross revenues.54 
• The controller is responsible for all aspects of processing and 
must be able to demonstrate compliance with law.55 
• Subjects must be given free access to data within one month 
of a request.56 
• Parental consent is usually required for subjects under age 
16.57 
2. The GDPR and Scientific Research 
The GDPR has a number of provisions relating to health and 
other scientific research. In general, the collection, use, and transfer 
of data for research purposes will become more uniformly regulated, 
an improvement over the current patchwork of rules. However, the 
specific rules are complex and generally more onerous than under 
current law.58 For example, “explicit” consent is required for 
sensitive data like health information, but it is not clearly defined.59 
More helpfully, scientific and other research receives some relief 
from the usual restrictions on collection and processing of data. For 
example, anonymous data—which is not identifiable to a human 
subject—is not subject to the GDPR at all,60 while pseudonymous 
                                                 
 51 Id. at arts. 6-7. 
 52 Id. at art. 9(2)(a). 
 53 Id. at art. 7(1). 
 54 Id. at art. 83(5). 
 55 Id. at recital 74, arts. 30, 42(4), 83. 
 56 Id. at art. 15. 
 57 Id. at art. 18. 
 58 See id. at recitals 159-62, arts. 5(b), 5(e), 9. 
 59 Id. at art. 9(2)(a). 
 60 Id. at recital 26. 
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data—which is not directly identifiable--is covered by the GDPR, 
but enjoys favored status.61 In addition, there are some 
circumstances in which a research organization may—and I stress 
may—be able to collect and process data without consent.62 In 
addition, obtaining broad informed consent from a research subject 
at the outset of a project may support more extensive processing than 
the Regulation would otherwise permit.63 Overall, after some 
detailed preparation, researchers will probably find it easier to do 
research in EU than under the current law. 
Sending data from the EU to the U.S. will remain a significant 
problem. Individual consent remains a valid basis for transfer.64 
Getting consent to transfer could presumably be part of obtaining 
informed consent to participate in the research. Absent consent, the 
available options continue to be new Privacy Shield,65 the unpopular 
model contractual clauses,66 and the even less popular binding 
corporate rules.67 
Non-profits cannot participate in the Privacy Shield because the 
rules are enforced by the FTC and non-profits are not subject to its 
jurisdiction.68 For eligible private companies, the substantive 
standards are similar to those under the former Safe Harbor, with 
heightened attention to GDPR principles. Important points of 
emphasis include the following: 
                                                 
 61 Id. at recitals 26-29, arts. 4(e), 25(1), 32(1)(a), 89(1). 
 62 See id. at arts. 5(1)(b), 6(1)(e)-(f), 9(2)(j). 
 63 See id. at recital 33. 
 64 Id. at art. 49(1). 
 65 See Privacy Shield Program Overview, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/Program-Overview (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
 66 Regulation 2016/679, supra nota 26 at arts. 46(2)(c)-(d), 93(2). 
 67 Id. at art. 47. 
 68 See generally PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, https://www.commerce.gov
/page/how-join-privacy-shield-guide-self-certification (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
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• Companies must self-certify their compliance to the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, 69 with annual renewal.70 
• Companies must commit—in a published privacy policy—
to greater transparency in data collection and handling.71 
• Companies are fully responsible for the conduct of their 
third-party data service providers.72 
• Companies must respond to EU citizen complaints within 45 
days, provide a free alternative dispute resolution service, and agree 
to binding arbitration before a “Privacy Shield Panel” whose 
members are jointly selected by the Department of Commerce and 
the EU.73 
• Companies transferring human resources data will be subject 
to the national DPAs in the EU countries where the data originates.74 
• The U.S. Commerce Department has committed to vigorous 
enforcement, including referrals to national DPAs.75 
                                                 
 69 How to Join Privacy Shield (Part 1), PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=How-to-Join-Privacy-Shield-part-1 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
 70 How to Re-certify to Privacy Shield, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=How-to-Re-certify-to-Privacy-Shield 
(last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
 71 How to Join Privacy Shield (Part 1), supra note 69. 
 72 Accountability for Onward Transfer, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=3-ACCOUNTABILITY-FOR-
ONWARD-TRANSFER (last visited Mar. 7, 2018); Obligatory Contracts for 
Onward Transfers, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=10-Obligatory-Contracts-for-Onward-
Transfers (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
 73 Recourse, Enforcement, and Liability, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=7-RECOURSE-ENFORCEMENT-
AND-LIABILITY (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
 74 The Role of the Data Protection Authorities, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=5-The-Role-of-the-Data-Protection-
Authorities-a-b (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
 75 Enforcement of Privacy Shield, PRIVACY SHIELD FRAMEWORK, 
https://www.privacyshield.gov/article?id=Enforcement-of-Privacy-Shield, (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2018). 
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• The EU data subject will have a “right to erasure” in many 
cases, including with respect to childhood or sensitive data;76 the 
CJEU has already found this to be a European fundamental human 
right.77 
B. Common Rule Revision 
1. From ANPRM to [Almost] Final Rule 
On January 19, 2017, in one of its last official acts, the outgoing 
Obama administration issued a final revised version of the Common 
Rule—the regulation that governs the treatment of human subjects 
in all federally funded research.78 This was the culmination of a 
process that began in 2011 when the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) issued an Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking, or ANPRM, that envisioned major changes to the 
original 1991 Common Rule.79 Then, on September 8, 2015, HHS 
and 15 other federal departments and agencies released a Notice of 
Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) that proposed specific changes to 
the Common Rule and opened a 90-day public comment period.80 
The NPRM’s proposed changes would have greatly altered the rules 
for human subjects research, especially regarding biospecimens. 
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Among the most controversial of its proposals was the 
expansion of the definition of regulated “human subjects research” 
to include research using anonymous or deidentified human 
biospecimens.81 This is a critical point because research that does 
not involve human subjects at all is not subject to the Common 
Rule’s requirements. The comments from industry, research 
universities, and scientific and professional organizations were 
highly critical of some of the proposed changes.82 There was an 
evident division between hard science (critical) and social science 
(anthropologists, for example); supportive commenters. Bioethicists 
were generally critical, but there were opinions on both sides.83 
Interestingly, the criticism of the NPRM did not follow partisan or 
ideological lines. With the exception of the bioethics community, 
just about everyone involved in research, from university medical 
centers to Big Pharma, opposed many of its provisions. There was a 
particularly withering critique of the biospecimen proposal from the 
National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, which 
argued that “continuing expansion of federal regulations on research 
is diminishing the effectiveness of the U.S. research enterprise.”84 
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The January 18, 2017 final version (the “Final Rule”) adopted 
some of the changes proposed in the NPRM and dropped others, 
including the controversial expansion of the definition of “human 
subjects” to include non-identified biospecimens.85 There have been 
numerous published summaries of the differences among the 
original Common Rule, the NPRM version, and the Final Rule.86 
Without trying to reinvent the wheel, here are some of the key 
provisions of the Final Rule that these sources point out. As just 
noted, the Final Rule does not expand the definition of “human 
subjects research” covered by the Common Rule to include research 
using anonymous or deidentified human biospecimens. At the same 
time, the Final Rule allows the use of “broad consent” from a subject 
for storage of and future research on identifiable biospecimens. The 
Final Rule states an intent to streamline and simplify informed 
consent documents, though it does add some additional elements—
including, interestingly, whether biospecimens will be used for 
commercial gain. The Final Rule expands the categories of research 
that are “exempt” from Common Rule regulation because of their 
low risk profile—though, in something of an oxymoron, it provides 
that some of these exempt categories will now require limited 
review by an Institutional Review Board. 
As it runs out, the Final Rule is still not final. Its “effective date” 
was to have been January 19, 2018. Responding to stakeholder 
complaints about the time needed to prepare and the lack of 
guidance from federal agencies, the Trump administration has 
postponed the “effective date and general compliance date” until 
July 19, 2018, with further delays possible.87 Until then, researchers 
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should continue to follow the original Common Rule and apply only 
those provisions of the Final Rule that are consistent with the earlier 
rule. 
2. Why Are Some Bioethicists Unhappy? 
Several prominent bioethicists have criticized the Final Rule’s 
failure to require informed consent for research on anonymous or 
deidentified human biospecimens. Hank Greely of Stanford has 
called it “a predictable result of the disparity in lobbying power” 
between the research and subject communities.88 Another critic is 
Rebecca Skloot, the author of the best-selling book, The Immortal 
Life of Henrietta Lacks.89 Lacks was a poor African-American 
woman who went to Johns Hopkins for treatment of cervical cancer, 
in the course of which some of her cancer cells were biopsied. Those 
cells—without her knowledge or consent—gave rise to the HeLa 
cell line which, directly and indirectly, has generated large amounts 
of money in which she and her descendants have never shared. A 
Lacks descendant has recently sued Johns Hopkins University in a 
belated effort to seek compensation. The suit faces many significant 
legal challenges, the biggest of which may be the statute of 
limitations. 
Skloot and other critics of the Final Rule worry about three 
broad categories of harms to research participants: privacy-related, 
emotional, and financial.90 On the privacy issue, Skloot has noted 
that Lacks ultimately lost her anonymity, and that she and her family 
endured the public disclosure of personal medical information.91 
That is likely to be an exceedingly rare event in the current research 
environment, regardless of how the Common Rule treats 
biospecimens. In fact, if I ask whether there a meaningful 
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probability that someone will have the means and motive to 
reidentify my biospecimen, and then use that information to harm 
me, my answer is no. 
Skloot has also drawn on the Lacks family’s experience to 
catalogue the possible emotional harms, including “the shock of 
learning they were part of research” and being drawn into “debates 
over who controlled samples” and how those samples could be 
used.92 I would not judge someone else’s reaction to these 
consequences, but I would discount it by the current probability of 
similar things happening—and Skloot deserves much of the credit 
for bringing attention to the issue and thereby reducing that 
probability. 
I think the most serious of these three concerns is the third, what 
Skloot has called “questions over profits.”93 A lot of people and 
institutions have made money from Henrietta Lacks’s cells. She got 
none of it, and she was never told that the research was going on. 
The same thing has happened in a couple of other notorious cases, 
most infamously the 1990 California case of Moore v. Regents of 
the University of California.94 This bothers me. If I am considering 
giving you a biospecimen and you think you might use it for money-
making purposes, you should tell me. Some people might refuse 
your request outright; I would personally want the opportunity to 
negotiate for a piece of the action. Curiously—to me—the research 
and bioethics communities have almost uniformly rejected the ideas 
that an informed consent document is a contract and, especially, that 
money can be used as an inducement to contribute a research 
biospecimen (though they do approve of token payments as 
compensation for the subject’s inconvenience). 
A few years ago, several colleagues and I published two articles 
advocating a contractual model for biospecimen contributions to 
biobanks.95 The key idea was a sliding scale of compensation: the 
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more control over the sample that the subject ceded to the 
researcher, the more the subject would get paid. The reaction, in 
print and at conferences where we presented the papers, was very 
negative. Allowing subjects to treat their DNA as a commodity 
seemed to be viewed as unethical. I remember one anonymous 
journal reviewer—who advocated rejecting the article—writing that 
we had totally ignored the lessons of the Henrietta Lacks case. We 
thought that we had come up with a way to prevent the same thing 
from happening in the future. The lesson I took away from the whole 
experience was that, to our critics, the ethical principle of subject 
autonomy was little more than a rhetorical construct. 
3. How Much Does the Final Shape of the Common Rule 
Really Matter? 
At least with respect to research using biospecimens, the answer 
may be: not all that much. The reason is that many, many people are 
regularly consenting to the use of their biospecimens without ever 
becoming aware of it. I owe this realization to Jean Cadigan, a 
medical anthropologist at UNC Medical School, who co-teaches my 
Biotechnology and Life Sciences course at UNC Law School. In a 
class last year, Cadigan led us through a fascinating exercise about 
consent to research in teaching and research hospitals (most use very 
similar forms, so these comments could apply to almost any 
university medical center). First, she showed us an elaborate, 
carefully crafted informed consent video used by a university-
affiliated biobank.96 The biobank offers all the protections that the 
Common Rule requires and more. Then we looked at a specific 
consent for treatment form from the same university’s hospital. By 
way of preamble, I should note that I and family members whom I 
have accompanied to various hospitals have had to sign this kind of 
document on several occasions in exigent circumstances. I have 
never read one—and I bet you have not either. We scribble our 
names on anything they put in front of us just to get the treatment 
started. 
                                                 
 96 I have chosen not to cite the forms—and thereby identify the hospital—
discussed in the text. I have confirmed that these forms and policies are similar to 
those used by many other university research hospitals and biobanks. 
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But what would we find if we did read it? In the example we 
looked at, at the end of a long paragraph entitled “Consent for Use 
and Release of Information,” I’d see that the patient gives the 
hospital permission “to release any information about me, my 
health, the health services provided to me . . . (4) as otherwise 
described in the Notice of Privacy Practices and as permitted by 
law.” Then, if I dug up that Notice (as Jean did for our students), I’d 
find that the hospital (taking advantage of a HIPAA exception) 
asserts the right, “without [the patient’s] authorization or an 
opportunity to agree or object,” to use or disclose personal health 
information or “surplus specimens” (anything they take out of your 
body that they don’t put back in) as long as “the use and/or 
disclosure relates to research.” The bottom line appears to be that, 
however the Final Rule treats biospecimens, the research world will 
still be awash in unwittingly donated—and anonymized—tissue 
samples. This makes the anguish over the Final Rule, and the ethical 
aversion to our contractual model, seem like rearranging the deck 
chairs on the Titanic. 
C. The FTC’s Foray Into Health Privacy Regulation 
In its July 29, 2016 decision in LabMD, Inc.,97 the Federal Trade 
Commission clearly signaled its intent to get more involved in the 
regulation of health privacy. Specifically, the case indicates that the 
agency intends to go well beyond its traditional role of protecting 
consumers against deception and to begin scrutinizing the nuts and 
bolts of companies’ health data security practices. 
In most cases, the privacy of individually identifiable health 
information is protected by HIPAA’s Privacy Rule, which is 
enforced by the Department of Health and Human Services. But 
HIPAA covers only data transactions between “covered entities” 
(providers, health plans, and health care clearinghouses) and their 
“business associates” (various kinds of service providers). 98A lot 
falls through the HIPAA cracks, including the communication of 
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individual patient information between treating physicians and 
testing laboratories, which is not covered by the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule. This is the gap that the FTC sought to fill. 
As I noted above, one piece of news in this case is the FTC’s 
move into the health privacy area. LabMD was in the clinical 
laboratory business from 2001 until 2014, when it suspended its 
testing business.99 However, it has retained its previously collected 
patient samples and data and continues to provide past test results to 
providers. Therefore, one lesson to be drawn from the decision is 
that if you are in the health business but not covered by HIPAA, you 
cannot assume that you are unregulated—the FTC will be watching, 
even if no one else is, for as long as you keep individual health data. 
The second piece of news is how far the FTC is going in its 
regulatory efforts. The agency has long claimed a mandate to 
regulate privacy under section 5 of the FTC Act, which authorizes it 
to police “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.” Until the last few years, the FTC focused on the word 
“deceptive” in scrutinizing privacy practices.100 It said, in effect, “we 
won’t tell you what to do, but if you disclose a privacy policy to 
consumers, you have to live up to it”—to do otherwise would be 
deceptive. Now the FTC is telling you what you have to do. 
In a series of more recent business cases (involving, for example, 
car dealers and hotels), the FTC has gone beyond posted privacy 
policies to take a close, substantive look at just what companies are 
doing to protect consumers’ personal and financial information.101 
The agency is insisting that privacy and data security practices be 
reasonable, a loosely defined and evolving standard that seems to 
focus on industry best practices. The regulatory algorithm is that 
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unreasonable privacy practices = unfair trade practices, and thus 
violate section 5.102 
This is precisely the approach the FTC took in the case. Among 
the data security practices deemed unreasonable were: failing to use 
an intrusion detection system, neglecting to monitor file integrity or 
traffic coming across the firewalls, never deleting any data, and not 
training employees. One consequence of this inattention was that 
employees installed P2P file-sharing software that exposed 
thousands of health records to the outside electronic world.103 
Exposed is a key word here: there was no evidence of any actual 
data theft. The FTC found this irrelevant, however. Its decision 
relied on the rarely cited section 5(n) of the FTC Act, which provides 
that an act or practice can be held unfair if it “causes substantial 
harm to consumers.” So the threat of harm can constitute substantial 
harm, and the absence of actual harm is no defense. 
A couple of other legal issues in the case are worth mentioning. 
The first concerns the FTC’s authority to judge the substantive 
adequacy of privacy practices, as opposed to merely ensuring that 
companies live up to their privacy policies. A number of FTC targets 
have challenged this authority, including LabMD, which asked both 
the FTC itself and two different federal courts to rule that the agency 
was going too far. Its requests were rejected, as has happened in 
every other case.104 The leading case is Wyndham Hotels, where the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the FTC’s 
authority to regulate the substance of cybersecurity. A second point 
concerns remedies.105 While the FTC has the power to fine 
offenders, it did not seek a monetary penalty against LabMD. 
Instead, it imposed (via injunction) detailed requirements for 
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improved security practices.106 Prospective targets should not take 
much comfort from this: the agency can seek fines, and LabMD 
complained bitterly about the burden imposed by the injunction. 
One piece of good news for potential targets is that private parties 
cannot sue for violations of the FTC Act, although they may have 
comparable rights under similarly worded state “Little FTC Acts” 
(e.g., North Carolina’s).107 
Companies that collect, transfer, store, or use individual health 
information should therefore keep these points in mind: 
• The fact that you are not a covered entity or business 
associate under HIPAA does not mean that you are free from federal 
regulation—the FTC is aggressively asserting its authority in the 
interstices of privacy law. 
• The FTC clearly believes that in privacy and data security, 
unreasonable = unfair and is thus illegal. 
• Reasonableness is a fluid and evolving concept, likely to be 
tied to best practices in a given industry. 
• To get a more specific idea of what the FTC thinks is and is 
not reasonable in the health context, read the full LabMD decision 
carefully, paying close attention to the technical details. In designing 
your own practices, avoid LabMD’s specific pitfalls, and whatever 
you do, do it better than LabMD did. 
•  The decision had no occasion to mention this, but the FTC 
does not have jurisdiction to regulate nonprofits. Someone else—
including your state government—will, however, and the FTC’s 
privacy standards are likely to provide a model for other regulators. 
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
The most accurate way—if not a very helpful way--to 
summarize the three developments discussed in this Essay is that 
health-related research is, from a legal perspective, getting both 
easier and harder. In the EU, the GDPR will provide a unified legal 
                                                 
 106 LabMD, Inc., FTC File No. 102-3099, Docket No. 9357 (2016), 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/102-3099/labmd-inc-
matter. 
 107 N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 75-1.1-45. 
350 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. [VOL. 19: 327 
framework, with significant exemptions for research. However, the 
protections given to data subjects have been expanded, the consent 
requirements have been strengthened, and the potential penalties for 
noncompliance have been increased dramatically. In this country, 
the revised Common Rule should make it easier to do research with 
non-identifiable biospecimens, and to obtain consent for any kind of 
research. At the same time, new consent provisions are intended to 
make research projects more transparent to participants while 
imposing few new burdens on researchers. On the other hand, the 
FTC—expanding its role as a general privacy regulator—is 
extending its reach into health privacy, with implications that are yet 
unknown. The best advice to research organizations is to pay closer 
attention than ever to the changing legal and regulatory 
environment: if you do things right, you will enjoy greater autonomy 
and protection, but if you do things wrong, the consequences may 
be more severe. 
 
